I have managed businesses of various sizes – hardware, software or services around the world but I have yet to witness a “strategic” restructuring program as poorly-planned, disruptive, disorganized, and suicidal as HP’s. Having closely followed HP as an arch rival back at Xerox, I must note that Leo Apotheker’s appointment by the Board could be the last “nudge” into a deep abyss for the company.
HP primarily consists of Imaging & Printing Group (IPG) providing consummer and business hardware and supplies worldwide generating over 20% of sales and about two-third of operating margins. In other words, HP is the biggest printer company on earth.
Personal Systems Group (PSG) sells desktop and notebooks PCs for commercial customers and consummers worldwide accounting for 35% of total sales. Technology Solutions Group (TSG) generates 45% of revenues. Within TSG, software accounts for only less than 5% of sales where Leo wants to bet the future of all HP by paying a ridiculous premium of 11 times sales for Autonomy. HP Services is largely EDS, a big deal done by previous CEO Hurd about two years ago.
On March 14th, Leo annonced at the HP Summit 2011 that he was betting on cloud services and software, including WebOS coming from another big acquisition – Palm again under Mr. Hurd's leadership. Leo revealed that WebOS would be the future operating system in all the 100 million devices devices that they intend to be selling.
I remember the TouchPad demo given by an old friend and brilliant marketer Marge Breya who now heads up software business within TSG. I also remember how shocked I was not to hear anything related to IPG or Enterprise Servers & Storage (ESS) businesses which account for almost all corporate profits.
In a nutshell, Leo’s new vision and corporate strategy is to be a "late me too" to Steve Jobs’ Apple while betting the future of HP on a line of business - software that today accounts for less than 5% of the company. As if all of this weren’t ridiculous enough, only less than two months later, the company said they would be discontinuing WebOS and TouchPads while exploring strategic options the for PSG division but again few days later given overwhelming demand for discontinued TouchPads, they will manufacture more TouchPads. For a brand as respected as HP's with resellers, distributors and retailers, these "zig-zag" strategies and resulting communications will quickly diminish a once-iconic brand.
So much for 100 million devices and the WebOS strategy outlined by Leo back in March. I have led divestitures of companies and assets worth as much as a billion dollars. I have never seen such a disasterously premature corporate announcement for the PC divison that will surely destroy the future sustainability of the business.
When you decide to explore strategic alternatives for an asset as large as $40 billion in sales, you just don’t make wishy washy annoucements to public but rather launch a fast-track, well-structured, multi-pronged effort with contingency plans in place to auction off the business supported by an army of advisors with track records. There are so many ways to maximize shareholder value from an auction or spin-off only if one can plan and manage effectively.
HP’s strategic blunders’ date back
to Carly Fiorina’s appointment who opted for a merger with rival computer
company Compaq. Following massive layoffs, R&D cuts and missed earnings, HP Board ousted Carly
in favor of Mark Hurd who was a brutal cost-cutter and a disciplined deal maker.
Just when I thought Hurd’s appointment was disasterous enough, HP Board appointed Leo Apotheker, a software executive who had not lasted at his previous employer SAP for even a year. I fundamentally question Mr. Apotheker’s credentials and track record as a software executive but even if we assumed he was the right candidate, managing an enterprise software business takes a radically different management talent than printers or servers or even outsourcing services.
Just when I thought Hurd’s appointment was disasterous enough, HP Board appointed Leo Apotheker, a software executive who had not lasted at his previous employer SAP for even a year. I fundamentally question Mr. Apotheker’s credentials and track record as a software executive but even if we assumed he was the right candidate, managing an enterprise software business takes a radically different management talent than printers or servers or even outsourcing services.
If HP Board and CEO insist on the current course, they would do more damage to HP than Hurrican Irene to the East Coast. They should not.
So how can HP be saved now?
1. Brand New Strategy - Define why HP should continue to exist.
I can clearly see Steve Jobs bold vision leading to Apple’s dominant innovative product
leadership and how it has orchestrated the rest of the company. I can clearly
see Lou Gerstner's courage and strategic brilliance leading to IBM’s “best customer experience” led, services-driven technology
supermarket strategy and its flowless execution.
When I look at HP on the other hand, what I see is worse than a blank sheet of paper.
HP ought to stick to its innovation heritage and seek new and different ways to leverage it. Can you tell me when was the last time you bought a cool HP product that you felt good about? How can one of the most customer-focused and brilliant marketing companies back in the 1990s be turned into such a diasarray and desparation so fast?
When I look at HP on the other hand, what I see is worse than a blank sheet of paper.
HP ought to stick to its innovation heritage and seek new and different ways to leverage it. Can you tell me when was the last time you bought a cool HP product that you felt good about? How can one of the most customer-focused and brilliant marketing companies back in the 1990s be turned into such a diasarray and desparation so fast?
HP’s fundamental core should center around on services-led
printing and information management. They should stick to their core and look for
adjacent markets to grow and dominate.
2. A New Structure - Technology super-market strategy has failed.
HP shareholders should put pressure on HP Board and
management to break the firm apart into two public companies: 1. "Hewlett Global Services" consisting of IPG,
software and HP legacy services. 2. "Packard IT Services" where PSG is to be bundled with ESS and spun-off
immediately.
HP could never leverage or execute its services strategy
beyond printers and MFDs. Given the chaos followed by massive executive
reshuffling and Livermore’s so-called promotion into a silent Board position, HP Services would not be able
to effectively compete against the likes of IBM and Accenture.
Both Carly and Hurd’s attempts to turn HP into world’s
largest IT company by buying Compaq and Palm have failed miserably.
PSG/ESS should be divested rather than auctioned to
ensure maximum value creation for shareholders. Following a seconday listing,
many strategic and financial buyers would be interested in the company.
3. HP Way is The Way – Embrace your heritage. Embrace your people.
HP culture has been severely traumatized since Carly’s
appointment. Hurd cut even more people as well as slashed R&D and
innovation. Unforetunately, Leo has only made it worse.
HP used to be a customer-led, market-connected,
innovative company. I wonder how many of HP Board of Directors or executive management actually read a copy of the book written by its founders - The HP Way?
It is so ironic that Leo decides to pay 11 times sales for an average Enterprise Content Management software company that has been shopped around for so long with no buyers in sight. This could have easily come from HP's very own garage should they not cut people and innovation so easily! I would like to know how management could ever justify this premium to shareholders?
It is so ironic that Leo decides to pay 11 times sales for an average Enterprise Content Management software company that has been shopped around for so long with no buyers in sight. This could have easily come from HP's very own garage should they not cut people and innovation so easily! I would like to know how management could ever justify this premium to shareholders?
I have yet to witness a corporate turnaround of this
magnitude who would have any chance of succeeding without wining the minds and hearts of your people. How can you
convince your best people to stick around if the leader in charge can unregrettably change his mind in less
than two months? or when you dont even blink about firing the entire leadership team in favor of outsiders?
HP badly needs a new Board of Directors who should in turn consider naming a new CEO - a lifetime HP insider similar to what Xerox did after Rick Thoman by naming Anne
Mulcahy CEO and Chairman. A name that would not surprise me is Anne Livermore who is still around. Unfortunately, the situation has became so severe that, only a well-respected insider (like Xerox' Mulcahy) can
stabilize the troups and eventually bring the moral back up.
The fundamental problem starts with how the Board of Directors selected incorrectly HP's business leaders. Time is of essence to save HP only if they can go back to the "HP Way" focusing on innovation and brilliant marketing centered on futuristic customer insights or just follow what Jobs did for Apple....
Otherwise, HPQ is headed for a corporate suicide…